sive analysis. 7 This Comment will critically examine contempt of court sanctions as an alternative to the exclusionary rule.
I. CONTEMPT AS AN ALTERNATIVE
The Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule to safeguard fourth amendment rights. This view, recently articulated in United States v. Calandra 8 and subsequent decisions, 9 differs from the earlier Mapp v. Ohio ' 0 concept of exclusion as an "essential part" of the fourth amendment's limitation upon the encroachment of individual privacy." The Court's movement away from characterizing exclusion as constitutionally mandated is significant for consideration of alternatives. If exclusion of evidence is not required by the fourth amendment, 12 the rule could be readily replaced by alternatives which can more effectively accomplish the rule's purposes while avoiding its considerable drawbacks.' 3 The exclusionary rule has not been successful in accomplishing its goals. The primary justification for the rule is the deterrence of police conduct that violates the fourth amendment.1 4 The Court viewed the rule as deterring police misconduct by "removing the incentive to disre-7 Of the works listed in note 6 supra, only Professor Blumrosen's 1957 article thoroughly examined contempt of court as an alternative. He focused on the use of contempt sanctions to punish the delay of preliminary hearings as an obstruction ofjustice. See Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 537-40. The late Washington Supreme Court Justice, Judge Robert Finley, championed the contempt alternative from the bench. His consideration of contempt in his dissent in McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wash. 2d at 542-43, 398 P.2d at 740-41, is the lengthiest examination of the alternative in any reported opinion.
The Israeli criminal justice system deals with illegal police searches by allowing the evidence to be used at the defendant's trial while punishing the misbehaving officer in a proceeding similar to American contempt actions. See Cohn, The Exc/usionay Rule Under Foreign Law: Israel, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 282 (1961) .
8 414 U.S. at 348: "The rule is ajudicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 9 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 482, 486. 10 367 U.S. 643 (1961) . 11 Id at 656-57. 12 Justice Black remarked in his opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire that "nothing in the Fourth Amendment provides that evidence seized in violation of that Amendment must be excluded." 403 U.S. at 498. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 499 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (exclusion is "a purely judge-created device").
13 "If an effective alternative remedy is available, concern for official observance of the law does not require adherence to the exclusionary rule." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 414 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 14 
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CONTEMPT AL TERA TIVE Contempt of court sanctions could be a more satisfactory remedy for fourth amendment violations than suppression. Courts use the contempt power to punish acts of disobedience or disrespect.' 9 If creation and enforcement of the exclusionary rule demonstrates the courts' special desire to safeguard fourth amendment rights, an unreasonable search or seizure could be construed as a serious instance of disrespect or disobedience of the judiciary. By using its contempt power against the police, the courts could directly and efficiently punish the misconduct while at the same time permitting reliable evidence to be used at trial. The goals of exclusion, particularly deterrence, 20 could be more effectively accomplished without the rule's accompanying drawbacks. A simple hypothetical, based on the suggestion of Dean Wigmore, 2 1
demonstrates the utility of a contempt alternative. Darryl Dogooder has coerced confessions or flawed lineup identifications is properly suppressed because of its inherent unreliability. Wilkey, supra note 4, at 227, n.49. Ifjustice is a truthseeking process, id. at 222, the exclusion of reliable evidence is not only a distortion of truth but an obstruction of justice as well.
In his often quoted opinion in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926) , then Chief Judge Cardozo laments the possible consequence of suppression:
The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. . . . A room is searched against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If the place of discovery may not be proved, the other circumstances may be insufficient to connect the defendant with the crime. The privacy of the home has been infringed and the murderer goes free. Id at 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. at 587, 588.
19 R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 1 (1963). 20 See, e.g., S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 71. Deterrence is a complex concept dependent on a number of variables, including the severity and certainty of punishment and the individual's knowledge of the law and its prescribed sanctions. Set, e.g., Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. GRIM. L.C. & P.S. 347, 348 (1955). The deterrent value of the contempt alternative would depend, in part, on how willing courts would be to punish police officers for their fourth amendment violations. This Comment's position, that police officers would be more effectively deterred from fourth amendment violations by the threat of direct punishment than by the possible suppression of evidence, is necessarily based on intuition. Since the contempt alternative has never been tried, data on its deterrent value are not available. Moreover, studies which have been done on the deterrent effect of exclusion have not been conclusive. Se note 16 supra. Finally, marginal deterrence, which considers whether one sanction is a more effective deterrent than another, requires specialized research well beyond the scope of this Comment. (For a detailed study on marginal deterrence, see F. ZIMRING 21 Dean John Henry Wigmore, in his landmark treatise on evidence, proposed a contempt alternative in these words:
The natural way to do justice here would be to enforce the healthy principle of the Fourth Amendment directly, i.e., by sending for the high handed, over-zealous marshal who had searched without a warrant, imposing a 30-day imprisonment for his contempt of the constitution and then proceeding to affirm the sentence of the convicted criminal. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 6. just had his wallet stolen from his back pocket. Darryl locates a policeman on patrol in the area, Officer Bumbling, and tells him about the crime. Although Dogooder never saw the pickpocket, Bumbling knows that a reputed pickpocket, Quincy Quigley, has been in the area. Several hours later, Bumbling bumps into Quigley. He immediately stops Quigley and, without a word of explanation, conducts a thorough patdown search. He finds in Quigley's back pocket a wallet which contains Dogooder's identification and credit cards. Quigley is arrested, booked and stands trial for petty theft. Despite the unlawful search of Quigley, the wallet and its contents would not be excluded but would be used at trial as evidence of Quigley's guilt. Quigley is eventually convicted on the basis of that evidence. Then, after announcing Quigley's sentence, the judge informs Bumbling that because of the unlawful search of the defendant, he is guilty of contempt and must pay a $100 fine.
22
The contempt of court sanction presents an attractive alternative to the exclusionary rule in this hypothetical. Highly probative evidence was admitted at the defendant's trial, and both wrongdoers, the pickpocket and the policeman, received direct, proportionate punishment from the court. Moreover, the officer will probably think twice before he makes an illegal search in similar circumstances. Despite these advantages, however, a contempt alternative would have significant flaws which would limit its practical scope. Before the practicality of applying this contempt alternative to all, or even some, 23 instances of police misconduct can be evaluated, the components of the contempt power should be examined.
II. THE CONTEMPT POWER
A. HISTORY
The power of the courts to punish contempts arose from the divine right of kings. The medieval monarch possessed absolute power and authority, 24 and subjects owed complete obedience to the king. As his 22 If he were the judge, Dean Wigmore might have assessed a stiffer sentence. See note 21 supra. Also, Wigmore's "contempt of the Constitution" is not a legal concept. He may have been calling for punishment of the police misconduct by any means or treating the Constitution as a set of court rules, violation of which would justify a contempt sanction. See Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 526, n.4. In any event, the step from Wigmore's contempt of the Constitution to contempt of court is not a long one. Id at n.3.
23 Professor Blumrosen suggested that the contempt power might be initially applied to a narrow area of police misconduct so as to gauge its deterrent effect. If it proved to be an effective deterrent, the remedy he proposed would then be extended into other areas by legislative or judicial action. Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 545. 24 R. GOLDFARB, supra note 19, at 11. Although the formal contempt power began during the Middle Ages, many older societies had similar schemes which also sought to assure respect for the governing sovereign. See id at 9-10.
[Vol. 72 CONTEMPT A L TERN4 TIVE kingdom grew, the monarch selected chancellors and judges to represent him in certain governing duties. Disobedience of their writs or orders was considered "a grievous contempt of the king." '25 Contempt of the king gradually evolved into contempt of the administration of justice. 26 . By the early eighteenth century, British courts could use summary convictions to punish a wide variety of contempts committed within and outside the courtroom. 27 This same extensive power was used by American colonial courts.
28
Americans saw the potential for judicial abuse of an unfettered contempt power. The Judiciary Act of 1789 vested in federal courts the power to punish by fine or imprisonment 2 9 any contempt of their authority. In 1826, Judge James Peck's controversial use of the contempt power to punish the author of an article that criticized Peck triggered strong protests.
3 0 The outcry led to passage of an Act in 1831 which restricted the courts' contempt power to three defined classes. The current federal statute limits the contempt power to the same three categories. 3 A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority and none other as:
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; Professor Dobbs notes that while both types of contempt can be used in the same proceeding, most courts seek the dominant purpose of the proceeding and classify the contempt accordingly. Id at 238.
36 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-04. A federal district court recently sought to achieve both aims by holding the superintendant of a woman's penitentiary in civil contempt for failing to comply with a prior court order regarding prison disciplinary procedures. Powell v. Ward, 487 F. Stipp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The superintendant was fined $5,000 plus $1,000 for every additional day of noncompliance with the order. The court believed the fine was needed to: (1) demonstrate to the defendants the seriousness with which the court viewed their noncompliance; and (2) generate the effort necessary for prompt and meaningful compliance. Furthermore, to make reparations to the inmates injured by the defendants' noncompliance, the court ordered the expungement of all records of disciplinary proceedings conducted in violation of the court order, and the payment of the inmates' attorneys' fees and nominal damages. Id. at 934-36.
One author has criticized the use of contempt as a means of compensating victims of noncompliance through the payment of monetary damages. Rendleman, Compensatog , Contempt to Collect Mone, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (1980) . He believes that this use of contempt springs from the outdated notion of the courts possessing a "roving commission under an inherent contempt power." Id at 635. He calls for courts to restrict the exercise of contempt powers to their statutory limits and to be skeptical of "achieving perfect solutions with blunt judicial remedies." Id at 636. 41 The civil contemnor has often been described as carrying the keys of his prison in his own pocket. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). This phrase refers to the fact that the civil contemnor's decision to comply with the court's order is all that is necessary to terminate his sanction.
In Powell v. Ward, the court's civil contempt sanction, an escalating fine, would be dropped if the prison superintendant achieved compliance within thirty days. After thirty days, the fine would cease increasing on the day the order was complied with. 487 F. Supp. at 935.
42 See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. at 442. 43 In Powell, the federal district court had to appoint a special master to expedite compliance efforts and to serve as the court's "eyes and ears." 487 F. Supp. at 935. A civil contempt sentence will often require some post-sentencing monitoring by the court so that the time of compliance can be determined. 44 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929 (1966) . A federal district court had issued injunctions against members of various "social groups," including the Ku Klux Klan, as well as against motel and restaurant owners, enjoining them from intimidating blacks who sought to use various public facilities in Saint Augustine, Florida. Charles Lance, an unsalaried deputy sheriff and a member of one of the enjoined groups, was adjudged to be in civil contempt for his abusive treatment of certain blacks. Id at 589-90. The district court's punishment, requiring Lance's immediate dismissal and forbidding him from serving as a peace officer in the future, was modified by the Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit held that, because the contempt was civil, the sanction had to be open-ended to give Lance an opportunity to purge himself. If he promised to comply with the injunction's terms, Lance could be permitted to return as a deputy. Id at 592.
If civil contempt sanctions were used against police officers on a regular basis, the issuing court would have trouble determining when, and whether, the officer had "purged" himself.
ing officer was merely required to promise not to repeat his abusive treatment of blacks.
Prosecutors would need to meet a higher standard of proof to secure a criminal, as opposed to a civil, contempt conviction. In a civil contempt action, the proof of the defendant's conduct must be clear and convincing, 4 5 a higher standard than the preponderance of the evidence standard commonly required in civil cases. In criminal contempt cases, the prosecutor bears the more. difficult burden of proving the contemnor's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 46 The intent requirements for civil and criminal contempt differ significantly. Willfulness need not be shown for a civil contempt conviction 47 -the mere fact of noncompliance or disrespect is sufficient to support the coercive penalty. 48 
CONTEMPT ALTERNATIVE
shown. 5 4 Ultimately, the degree of willfulness that a court requires will affect the deterrent potential of the contempt alternative. If a court's intent requirement is difficult to meet, prosecutors will rarely be able to secure contempt convictions. 5 5 A slight chance of punishment will hardly be an adequate deterrent to police misbehavior. The location of contumacious behavior determines whether a contempt is direct or indirect. Direct contempt generally takes place within the presence of the court.
5 6 Disruptions in the courtroom and insults to the judge are two examples of direct contempt. Indirect contempt consists of all misbehavior of which the court has no firsthand knowledge. Thus, police misconduct would almost always be classified as indirect contempt.
The distinction between direct and indirect determines the type of hearing an alleged contemnor receives. Some direct contempts can be punished summarily, without affording the contemnor any notice or formal hearing. 58 Summary contempt has been confined to extraordinary situations where instant action is necessary to vindicate the court's authority or prevent obstruction of justice. 5 9 When the contempt is indiallegedly contumacious disobedience of a court order might be regarded as willful: (I) the defendant intended both to violate the order and to express defiance in doing so; (2) the defendant intended to disobey the order; (3) the defendant intended to perform the conduct which violated the order; or (4) the defendant's action was of a "particularly bad quality." Dobbs concludes that an acceptable standard for willfulness should at least include the contemnor's realization of his disobedience. 54 Kuhns, supra note 49, at 50-51. Professor Kuhns notes that certain courts require a showing of subjective criminal intent, "thereby implying that the defendant must actually intend to act wrongfully or, at least, be aware of the likelihood that his conduct is wrongful. 57 The best example of indirect contempt would be disobedience of a judicial order to be performed outside the courtroom. See Dobbs, supra note 35, at 224-25.
58 Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits summary contempt punishment "if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt" and if the contumacious act was committed in the actual presence of the court. Since fourth amendment violations by police generally occur outside the courtroom and cannot receive immediate judicial attention, they cannot be dealt with summarily. Due process requirements must be met.
C. PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES
An officer facing a possible contempt conviction is entitled to a number of procedural guarantees. Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires notice and hearing for contempt proceedings.
62
The notice required for contempt proceedings must provide the essential facts constituting the contempt, but need not have the technical accuracy of an indictment.
6 3 Rather, the notice should be sufficiently particular to inform the officer of the events constituting the contempt so as to give him a fair opportunity to defend himself.64 The contempt should be designated as civil or criminal. 65 The notice can be delivered in various forms. The judge can orally notify the officer of the contempt upheld summary contempt convictions of immunized witnesses who refused to obey a court order to testify at a criminal trial. It emphasized that summary punishment is permissible where the trial judge must act swiftly and firmly to prevent contumacious conduct from disrupting the orderly progress of a criminal trial. charge during the criminal defendant's trial. 66 An order to show cause why the defendant should not be held in contempt can be issued by the trial judge or upon application of the contempt prosecutor. 67 An arrest order 68 or even an indictment 69 would satisfy the notice requirements.
The time and place of the contempt hearing must be stated in the notice.70 The officer must be given reasonable time to prepare a defense. Although the trial court has discretion in the amount of time it can provide, 7 1 contempt convictions have been overturned on this issue. 72 A fair interval would become standard after initial experimentation. Thus, following the criminal defendant's trial, the judge would tell the officer charged with contempt that he had a certain number of days to return to court to defend himself.
The hearing for an officer charged with contempt serves a number of purposes. To impose a just punishment, a sentencing judge should know all the facts surrounding the officer's conduct. 73 Disputed issues can be properly resolved at a full hearing. 74 At the hearing, the officer should be able to call witnesses and receive the assistance of counsel in order to exculpate himself or to prove extenuating or mitigating circumstances. 78 Id at 380. Six month imprisonment was treated as the dividing line between petty and serious punishments. Id at 379. The Court observed that, historically, petty sentences could be administered without jury trials. Since Cheff received a six-month prison sentence, he could be convicted without a jury trial.
391 U.S. 194 (1968). 80
The Chef decision was not of a constitutional dimension, but was made under the Court's supervisory power over federal courts. The Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), held that the right to a jury trial for serious offenses was guaranteed for both federal and state trials by the sixth and fourteenth amendments, respectively. Thus, the constitutional quality of the Bloom ruling enabled it to apply equally to state and federal proceedings.
81 Bloom was charged with criminal contempt for introducing a false will to probate. He was denied a jury trial and convicted and sentenced to prison for twenty-four months. 391 U.S. at 195. To determine whether he was wrongly deprived of a jury trial, the Court explored whether his offense could be considered serious, and looked to the maximum sentence authorized by the Illinois legislature. Since no maximum penalty had ever been established, the Court relied on the penalty actually imposed as the best evidence of the seriousness of the offense. Id at 211. It concluded that a two-year prison sentence was serious and that Bloom was entitled to a jury trial. Id 82 Id at 202. The Court declared that "in terms of those considerations which make the right to a jury trial fundamental in criminal cases, there is no substantial difference between serious contempts and other serious crimes." Id 83 Id at 211. 84 See Kuhns, supra note 67, at 498-99 (precedent for maximum contempt penalties has been established).
85 The United States Code defines offenses as petty if their penalties do not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of five hundred dollars. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1969). But, the five hundred dollars fine by itself has not served as an indicator that "serious punishment is contemplated." In Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) , the Court refused to grant a jury trial in a case where a union had been fined $10,000 for being in contempt of court. "[W]e cannot say that the fine of $10,000. . .was a deprivation of such magnitude D. THE FEDERAL CONTEMPT STATUTE The contempt power of the federal courts has been statutorily restricted to three types of misbehavior. 8 6 Police misconduct punishable as contempt under the present statute must fit under one of these categories: (1) misconduct in the court's presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; (2) misbehavior of court officers; (3) disobedience of the court's "writ, process, order, rule, decree or command." 8 7
The fourth amendment violations by the police probably would not fit under either of the first two categories. Conduct punishable under the first category 88 must occur in or close to the courtroom. 8 9 The second category, "officers of the court," typically applies to judges, marshalls, bailiffs and all others whose services are rendered solely for judicial purposes. 90 Attorneys 9 ' and law enforcement personnel 92 are not considered officers of the court for purposes of this statute.
To punish police misbehavior as contempt, the misconduct must be construed as disobedience of a court order. The courts would need to issue some type of decree, order, or set of rules which would specify directives and prohibitions for police behavior. 93 Officers would be held that a jury should have been interposed to guard against bias or mistake." Id at 477. Thus, a criminal contempt case in which the penalty could be a fine exceeding five hundred dollars may not always necessitate a jury trial. Compare Girard v. Goins, 575 F.2d 160, 163-65 (8th Cir. 1978) ($500 fine establishes no entitlement to jury trial, but fines between $2,500 and $10,000 indicate that contempts are serious) with Richmond Black Police Officers v. City of Richmond, 548 F.2d at 127 (fine exceeding $500 means the contempt is serious and requires a jury trial. 93 The Supreme Court has been authorized to prescribe procedural rules for criminal proceedings, 18 U.S.C. § § 3771-72 (1969), civil actions, admiralty cases, and proceedings for in contempt only if they disobeyed one of these directives or prohibitions during a search or seizure.
The order itself would be determinative of the validity of a contempt sanction for disobedience. The order must be clear and specific, leaving no doubt or uncertainty in the minds of those to whom it is addressed.
94 Court decrees will not be expanded or twisted by implication beyond the plain meaning of their terms. 95 However, the parties to whom an order is directed must obey its commands even if the commands are later declared invalid. 96 Courts have held persons in contempt for disobeying orders which are eventually found invalid. CHI. L. REv. 619, 633-36 (1977) . This rulemaking power is limited to judicial activities. The rulemaking power is not analogous to a power to make rules for police behavior. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in a search and seizure case, could end the confusion now prevalent in fourth amendment law by setting out guidelines for what police can and cannot do under the Constitution. It is unlikely, however, that such a ruling, if issued, would be construed as a "lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command," disobedience of which would be punished as contempt. Most federal courts have been reluctant to exercise their contempt powers in cases not falling within the confines of a narrow construction of the contempt statute. Cir. 1974 ). The case also points out that while stretching will not occur, the order will be read in light of the purpose for which it was entered, and thus may be subjected to a reasonable interpretation. Id 96 "Persons who make private determinations of the law and refuse to obey an order generally risk criminal contempt even if the order is ultimately ruled incorrect." Manness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975 104 Civil contempt has been used to respond to police disobedience of court orders. Unlike the punitive measures in Shipp, the civil sanctions were meant either to coerce police compliance with the order, or to compensate victims of the contempt.1 0 5
Hicks v. Knight 106 involved police misconduct during civil rights demonstrations in Bogalusa, Louisiana. A federal district court enjoined police officials and officers from failing to protect the demonstrators from harassment and assaults. Three weeks later, the same court held the police chief and the public safety commissioner in civil contempt.
7
They were fined $100 a day and sentenced to remain in the custody of the Attorney General until they demonstrated compliance with the court order by following the court's eight-point plan. 108 Id at 1507-08. The plan included a requirement that the police department develop a comprehensive program "for police coverage in the City of Bogalusa including coverage of all picketing and demonstrations." The program was to contain specific written instructions as under their charge was also held in civil contempt for refusing to obey the court's initial order. His $25 a day fine continued until he agreed to follow the court order. 109
In Clark v. Boynton,1I 10 another civil contempt sanction was issued to misbehaving police officers. In the spring of 1965, white policemen in Selma, Alabama prevented blacks from registering to vote. The federal district court, through a temporary restraining order, prescribed certain registration procedures. Law enforcement officials were directed not to intimidate or harass any citizens attempting to register."' About two weeks after the order's issuance, Sheriff James Clark and his deputies were confronted by nearly two hundred young black demonstrators at the county courthouse. The sheriff and about twenty deputies surrounded the teenagers and forced them to march for several miles through the streets of Selma. For this action, the district court held Sheriff Clark in "direct contempt" of its order and fined him $1,500.112 The Fifth Circuit vacated the contempt order because of the district court's failure both to specify whether the contempt was civil or criminal and to provide necessary procedural safeguards for the sheriff. Hicks and Clark demonstrate the inherent problems with civil contempt sanctions for police misconduct. Inasmuch as civil contempt is punished indeterminately, courts would constantly need to monitor the contemnor's behavior to determine when the open-ended sentence could be lifted."
6 Judicial resources would be strained considerably by this task. Furthermore, sentences which would terminate on a showing of good behavior would be much less of a deterrent than definite punitive criminal contempt sanctions.
to the duties of each officer and written assurances from the officer that he understood and would comply with the program.
B. ORDERS GRANTED AGAINST THE POLICE
Courts have granted injunctions against persistent patterns of police misconduct. Disobedience of these orders could have been punished with contempt sanctions. In Allen v. Mendrano,117 the Supreme Court upheld a district court order prohibiting Texas police officers from unjustifiably interfering with union organizing efforts.' 18 Thirty-five years earlier, in Hague v. CYO,' 19 the Court upheld similar relief against police officers who sought to crush a rising labor union.120 The orders in both cases did not restrain any lawful police conduct. 12 1 Lower federal courts have also granted injunctive relief against police misconduct.
122
The power of federal courts to enjoin police misconduct is not un-117 416 U.S. 802 (1974). 118 In 1966-67, attempts were made to unionize the Mexican-American farmworkers of the lower Rio Grande Valley. Local and state police officers allegedly used unlawful arrests, detentions and confinements to intimidate the organizers. The union efforts collapsed after a year of constant police pressure. Id at 809. The federal district court, upon the union's request, issued an injunction specifically prohibiting the police from using their authority to arrest, stop, disperse or imprison the plaintiffs without adequate cause. Id. at 811 n.7. Adequate cause was defined as either (1) unreasonable interference with public or private passways, (2) force or violence, or (3) probable cause to believe a crime had been, or was about to be, committed. Id at 814. The Court felt this injunction was appropriate in light of the persistent pattern of police misconduct. Id at 815. 119 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 120 In 1937, the CIO, an organization established to organize workers into labor unions, launched a drive for members in Jersey City, New Jersey. City officials, believing the CIO to be a Communist organization, prevented CIO leaders from holding public meetings and, eventually, from remaining in the city. The Supreme Court upheld an injunction which enjoined Jersey City police from: (1) interfering with the union leaders' free access to the city's streets and parks; (2) removing union leaders from the city; (3) enforcing a void ordinance which prevented the union from publicly distributing their leaflets and handbills; and (4) enforcing an ordinance requiring permits for any public gathering. Id. at 517-18. limited. A persistent pattern of misbehavior, rather than an isolated incident, must be shown before an injunction will be granted. 23 Thus, an allegation of a single unlawful search was held insufficient to support an injunction against police search tactics in Long v. District of Columbia.
124
The appellate court not only required a pattern of unlawful police action, but "a substantial risk that future violations will occur." 125 The Supreme Court has also restricted federal court intervention in local law enforcement activity. In Rizzo v. Goode,126 the Court refused to uphold a district court injunction requiring the Philadelphia police department to develop a comprehensive civilian complaint procedure. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said that the injunction was a sharp limitation on the police department's latitude in its own internal affairs, 127 and that the principles of federalism required the injunction's dismissal. 128 The Riwzo holding would not prohibit the contempt alternative. Rzzo applied to an injunction regulating the internal affairs of a police department.12 9 The search and seizure methods of a police department are not internal affairs. Moreover, the contempt alternative should not (1980) . In Lyons, the Ninth Circuit held that a citizen had standing to seek injunctive relief to enjoin the Los Angeles Police Department's use of stranglehold controls in non-lifethreatening situations. The plaintiff sought the injunction after he allegedly had been rendered unconscious by a stranglehold applied by officers who had stopped him for a traffic violation. 615 F.2d at 1244. The Ninth Circuit found the use of these holds to be "accepted police practice, even in non-life-threatening situations." Id at 1246. Although the plaintiff's claim was based on only one stranglehold incident, the court believed the claim could be heard because "there is a strong possibility of recurrence of this police tactic." Id at 1248. The actual injunction against the Los Angeles Police Department has been stayed by the Ninth Circuit pending appeal.
126 423 U.S. 362 (1976) . 127 Id at 379. The injunction was ordered by the District Court after a long trial involving a series of police violations of the constitutional rights of Philadelphia minority group members. The injunction directed the Philadelphia police to draft a comprehensive program for adequately dealing with civilian complaints. Id at 369. The district court suggested guidelines for this program, and appropriate revisions of police manuals and rules of procedure were to be major parts of this program. Id at 369-70. The District Court saw its order as a necessary first step in its attempt to prevent future police abuses. Id at 370.
128 Id at 378. Justice Rehnquist recognized that federalism governs the relationship between federal courts and state governmental branches in ongoing criminal proceedings. Id at 380. He also noted that the principles of federalism are applicable when certain injunctive relief is sought against a local police department. Id When the district court "injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of [the Philadelphia Police Department]," the Court held that it had departed from those principles. Id See also Lewis v. Hyland, 554 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1977).
129 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. at 380.
be based on individual district court injunctions against local police departments. Rather, in the interest of uniformity of constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court should issue the order which police officers would be required to obey under threat of contempt.
IV. REVISING THE PROPOSAL
The Wigmore-inspired contempt proposal is not a realistic alternative to the exclusionary rule. Its attractive simplicity and efficiency would not be possible given the limited indirect contempt powers of American courts. Therefore, the Wigmore model must be modified before a viable contempt alternative can be evaluated.
A. TYPE OF CONTEMPT
Wigmore called for the misbehaving police officer to be prosecuted for contempt of the Constitution. 130 Although this suggestion is an inventive way to characterize fourth amendment violations, American courts are limited to civil and criminal contempt of court sanctions. Both types have distinct advantages and drawbacks for the contempt alternative.
Courts might justify the use of civil sanctions as a means to compel future compliance with the fourth amendment. Civil contempt would be easier to establish than criminal contempt because it requires no showing of willfulness and only a preponderance of the evidence. 13 '
Courts which try to use the least available power when resorting to contempt might prefer coercive civil penalties over punitive criminal measures.1 3 2 The indeterminate nature of the civil contempt penalty, however, would require continuing court involvement following sentencing. 13 3 This strain on judicial resources and the questionable deterrent value of civil contempt sanctions 34 outweigh any advantages. Therefore, civil contempt sanctions would not be a practical remedy for police violations.
130 See note 22 supra for further treatment of Wigmore's "contempt of the Constitution" concept.
131 In the hypothetical illustrating Wigmore's contempt proposal, if Officer Bumbling's actions were not willful, the judge might use a civil contempt sanction to coerce Bumbling's compliance with approved search and seizure procedures. Bumbling would be fined $500, but since civil contempt requires that the punishment terminate on a showing of compliance, see note 41 supra, the fine could be refunded to him if he was not found guilty of any similar convictions during the next twelve months. 132 Some courts, aiming to employ "the least possible power" when resorting to contempt punishment consider the coercive civil contempt sanction before the harsher punitive criminal contempt measure. See note 39 sura. 
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The purpose of the contempt alternative suggests that criminal contempt sanctions would be the preferable remedy for police misconduct. The contempt alternative aims to deter police misconduct by directly punishing officers for actions that violate the Constitution.
1 3 5 Since criminal contempt punishes completed acts while civil contempt coerces future compliance, the police violation should be punished as criminal contempt.
1 3 6 However, because it demands some showing of willfulness and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, criminal sanctions may be difficult to secure for many police violations.
1 3 7 Despite these proof problems, the determinate, punitive criminal contempt sanction would be the more appropriate punishment for police misbehavior under the contempt alternative.
B. NOTICE AND HEARING BEFORE PUNISHMENT
Assuming the officer's misconduct did not take place in the court's presence, he could not be punished summarily-he would be entitled to both notice and hearing before contempt punishment would be considered. If, during the criminal defendant's trial, the judge believed there was evidence of illegal police conduct, he could order a contempt hearing on the matter.
1 38 This hearing would take place shortly after the defendant's trial, regardless of its outcome, either before the same judge or a new one.
39
The due process requirements are necessary to assure fair treatment of the officer. These requirements, however, reduce the efficiency of the contempt alternative. Full hearings to determine whether an officer should be held in contempt probably would require more court time than is presently needed for most motions to suppress. Yet, this burden 135 See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra for discussion of the purposes of criminal contempt.
136 Professor Goldfarb stated that disobedience of court orders, which police misconduct must be construed as under the contempt alternative, is characteristically considered civil contempt, unless the disobedience is of a gravity which would suggest some public interest. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 19, at 67. Police disobedience is clearly of significant public interest.
137 See notes 46, 55 & accompanying text supra. 138 Since the defense attorney would have little incentive to pursue a contempt conviction against the offending officer, the judge presiding in a criminal case would need to be particularly alert for police violations of the fourth amendment. See S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 72.
139 Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the disqualification of the trial judge from hearing the criminal contempt case if the contempt charged involves disrespect or criticism of a judge. This provision is meant to prevent any personality clashes from interfering with the expected impartiality of the contempt hearing. A change ofjudges may not be necessary, however, when the contempt is not a personal attack on the judge, as in the case of police misconduct. Cf Kuhns, supra note 67, at 529 (fear that even a new judge could be prejudiced by the assessment of seriousness made by the original judge).
on the crowded court schedules might be justified if the contempt alternative is shown to be an improved protector of citizens' fourth amendment rights.
Neither the defense attorney nor the prosecutor in the earlier criminal case would be likely to accept the responsibility of prosecuting the officer at his contempt hearing. The defense attorney would have little incentive to prosecute a police officer because the potential contempt conviction could not be used as evidence in his client's appeal.140 The prosecuting attorney would be reluctant to prosecute the same officer who brought in the criminal, since prosecutors rely on maintaining good relations with the police. 14 ' Moreover, the prosecutor might not treat contempt cases as seriously as his other criminal cases.
142
The court would have to supply the prosecutor of the offending officer. The court can appoint a United States attorney or a private lawyer to prosecute criminal contempt cases.1 43 Since appointment may not be feasible if a large number of misconduct cases arose, the court might instead hire a special prosecuting team to handle all contempt cases brought against the police. These special prosecutors would be affiliated with the court, and to prevent any conflicts of interest, would be entirely separate from the prosecutor's office. Their sole responsibility would be to conduct all investigative, procedural and prosecutorial tasks beginning with the court's contempt notice and continuing until the final verdict of the judge hearing the case. 144
C. RESTRICTING AND EXPANDING PUNISHMENT OPTIONS
Courts issuing contempt punishments would not be limited to the thirty-day prison terms suggested by Wigmore. The contempt statute presently permits the use of fines or imprisonment as contempt sanctions. 145 Judges who impose fines on officers should prohibit any contribution from the department or the governmental employer to maximize 140 An officer's contempt conviction for an illegal search would not be relevant to the defendant's guilt. Whatever their length, prison sentences for law enforcers demand careful consideration by judges. Police officers would be subject to greater risks of violence than most prisoners since they represent the forces that put many inmates behind bars. However, if judges seriously considered prison terms for serious police misconduct, and the officers were aware of this possibility, the threat of imprisonment could be one of the strongest deterrents against police misbehavior. lice misconduct could be classified. Thus, the first step in implementing a contempt alternative must be the issuance of an order regarding police search and seizure procedures. The order to police officers would have to be clear. The order could not simply require officers always to comply with the fourth amendment; one cannot be held in contempt for disobeying a vague order. 153 To avoid vagueness problems, the order should specifically inform police of: (1) their duties under the order; (2) conduct prohibited by the order, and (3) the potential punishment for disobedience. A court attempting to frame an order encompassing the totality of fourth amendment law will face a monumental task. A possible approach to this problem would involve the court's solicitation of suggestions and comments from interested parties, such as police and citizens' groups and legal scholars.1 5 4 Using the expertise of these groups, a court would be better able to formulate a clear and specific order.
The order might be more than just an opening for the courts' use of their contempt powers. The law of search and seizure has degenerated into confusing technicalities; 155 if the order clearly explains proper search and seizure methods, fourth amendment law could be easier to understand. Some commentators have remarked that police officers break the law simply because they have no idea what it is.156 The Boston Police Task Force recently prepared a booklet of guidelines for various criminal investigation procedures. 157 Their highly readable work demonstrates the potential value of clear directives for the police.
To achieve some uniformity in the interpretation of fourth amendment law, the Supreme Court should formulate the order and apply it to all American police departments. As it considered another difficult fourth amendment problem, the Court might choose to avoid creating another exception to the exclusionary rule and to eliminate the rule en- should result from the direct punishment of police officers. 164 The amount of improvement would partly depend on the severity and certainty of punishment for police misconduct. 165 Given the Supreme Court's emphasis on deterrence in justifying retention of the exclusionary rule, 166 any improvement in deterrence of police misconduct would be important.
The contempt alternative would permit the introduction of reliable evidence despite police misconduct. The excluded evidence is typically reliable, and often "the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant."' 167 Thus, exclusion of improperly obtained evidence usually results in the defendant's release. 168 Rather than increasing public respect for the courts, this result may cause them to appear foolish. 16 9 By admitting reliable but tainted evidence into the defendant's trial and then punishing the wrongdoing official, the contempt alternative permits the courts to punish two guilty persons rather than none. 170 Public respect for the judiciary will not diminish if courts use illegally obtained evidence to reach the truth and then punish'any public officer involved in the illegality.
A wide variety of sanctions would be available to courts using the contempt alternative. Courts could tailor the sanction-fines, imprisonment and, with legislative help, suspensions-to the seriousness of the violation. Officers engaging in outrageously unconstitutional conduct would receive harsh and swift punishment. Judges also might consider the officer's past record in assessing punishment; officers who repeatedly commit minor infractions may require more than a slap on the wrist to deter further misconduct. Courts could be lenient with officers whose infractions were committed in the good faith belief that their conduct was legal. Any sanction assessed for good faith violations would have a 170 Dean Wigmore criticized the exclusionary rule for letting both the misbehaving police officer and the criminal go free. "Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else." 8 WIGMORE, upra note 6.
[Vol. 72 greater deterrent effect than exclusion. 1 7 1 The exclusionary rule offers one remedy-suppression of tainted evidence-for all degrees of police misconduct. Justice is not served when officers using a deficient search warrant are treated in the same way as officers who break down a door to make an unannounced warrantless search.
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As a replacement for the exclusionary rule, the contempt alternative could be expanded beyond police violations that are discovered during criminal trials. The exclusionary rule is invoked only if illegally obtained evidence is sought to be introduced at trial, and thus the rule cannot act against police misconduct which is not directed toward acquiring evidence.17 3 The rule is therefore inapplicable to a high proportion of police activity.1 74 Contempt sanctions could be used to punish fourth amendment violations beyond the reach of the exclusionary rule.
Monitors could be appointed by the courts to assist them in the substantial investigative and administrative work involved in extending the contempt alternative beyond police violations revealed at trial. Although the revised model of the contempt alternative provides a special prosecutor to handle contempt cases, 175 his work should be limited to the period following the issuance of the contempt notice. Monitors, similar to masters, are advisory officials appointed by the court to assist in the handling of a particular case. 176 Courts could appoint monitors to 171 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 435, 459 n.35; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 540 (White, J., dissenting). The Williams majority, which recently created a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the Fifth Circuit, see note 3 supra, noted that "[ilt makes no sense to speak of deterring police officers who acted in the good faith belief that their conduct was legal by suppressing evidence derived from such actions unless we somehow wish to deter them from acting at all." 622 F.2d at 642.
172 Chief Justice Burger remarked, in reference to this anomaly: "...
[E]very violation . . . should not evoke the same judicial response. Letting a mouse free in a schoolroom is not as serious as putting a tiger there and the law would hardly punish these two acts in the same way." Burger, supra note 5, at 13 n.42. hear and investigate citizen complaints of improper police tactics, 177 and, if the monitor concludes that an officer has engaged in unconstitutional activity, he could apply to the court for permission to draw up an order to show cause against the disobedient officer. Since the monitor would need a number of assistants to carry out his responsiblities properly, present budgetary constraints might prevent this extension of the contempt alternative. Nevertheless, the availability of this option offers greater flexibility to courts seeking to protect citizens' fourth amendment rights.
B. WEAKNESSES
The contempt alternative has a number of serious problems. The problems inherent with punishing law enforcement officers and the potential deterrence of lawful police conduct are relatively minor weaknesses. However, the considerable difficulties in framing the necessary order and in justifying a court's involvement would ultimately prevent the contempt alternative from serving as a remedy for all fourth amendment violations by police.
The contempt alternative will punish officers and could affect the manpower levels of police departments. If officers are suspended without pay or imprisoned for fourth amendment violations, police departments will need to hire more persons to guarantee that sufficient personnel are available to patrol the streets. Although in many cities, such as Chicago, waiting lists for police employment are lengthy, the possibility of punishment for discretionary decisions may discourage persons from seeking careers in police work. Patrol positions, which often have the most uncertain guidelines1 78 and the most dangerous responsibilities, could be decimated by this added disincentive. Salaries would need to be increased to compensate for the risk of contempt punishment. Local governments straining to keep budgets under control will not appreciate plans which force them to hire more policemen at 177 The Use of § 1983 Comment suggests that the monitor be an active rather than passive figure, and seek out information falling within his mandate rather than merely waiting for complaints to spur him to action. Comment, Use of § 1983, supra note 6, at 114-15.
Of course, complaints against police misconduct can always be brought in the form of section 1983 suits for damages or injunctions. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1979). This statute permits citizens to proceed directly against police officers for "deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws." These suits have many shortcomings as a practical remedy for police misconduct. See Project, supra note 147.
178 Professor Wilson found that patrol duty was not a popular assignment. J. WILSON, supra note 174, at 52-53. A major reason for this dislike of patrol work is the lack of clearly defined expectations. Non-patrol personnel have "clearer, less ambiguous objectives . . . need not get involved in family fights or other hard to manage situations and. . . need not make hard-to-defend judgments." Id at 53. The additional element of contempt sanctions will increase the uncertainty in a patrol officer's work.
higher salaries. 179 The threat of punishment might deter many legal searches and seizures. Despite the specificity of the court order, officers will encounter situations demanding responses that cannot be definitely classified as "prohibited" or "permitted". Faced with the possibility of fines, suspensions or imprisonment, officers will often choose to forego conduct of questionable legality.' 8 0 The officers' reluctance to act might be viewed as a positive step toward reducing police misconduct. The deterrence of lawful police conduct could, however, hinder local law enforcement.
The order required by the contempt alternative would be a practical impossibility. For the police to be held in contempt for disobeying a court order, the order itself must clearly describe the permissible and impermissible. If the contempt alternative replaced the exclusionary rule in all applicable situations, the court would need to enumerate all fourth amendment violations which could be punished as contempt. Although it might be easier to lay down rules for law enforcement than for the maintenance of order, '81 a greater number of search and seizure possibilities will still need to be considered. The commendable guidelines prepared by the Boston Police Task Force, 18 2 though clear and detailed, would fall short of the specificity required of the triggering order because they did not treat every possible fourth amendment violation for which an officer could receive a contempt sanction. Yet, any effort to treat all search and seizure situations would be too complex and technical for the average patrolman to understand. Given the competing requirements of clarity and specificity, the order required by the contempt alternative could not be drawn.
The most glaring flaw of the contempt alternative involves its most basic element, participation of the judiciary. Even if it could be prepared, the order needed to trigger the contempt alternative could not be 179 Probably a more economical way to adjust to the contempt alternative would be to improve the selection and training of police officers. Professor Inbau has advocated improved police selection and training as the most effective means of improving police practices. The contempt alternative is not a practical replacement for the exclusionary rule. The alternative would seek to punish unconstitutional actions by police officers with contempt of court sanctions. Since courts can only use contempt powers in limited instances, police misbehavior would need to be construed as disobedience of a court order. An expansive court order covering all police conduct and applicable to federal, state and local law enforcement officers would be needed. Such an order would not only be a monumental undertaking, but would not be feasible in a system where courts attempt to tailor remedies to the controversies before them. The contempt alternative fails because it requires judicial involvement beyond constitutional limits.
Despite its flaws, the contempt alternative possesses numerous advantages over exclusion. Deterrence of police misconduct would be improved through the direct punishment of officers. Flexible contempt bedience of a court order, some courts may not approve of the extension of contempt sanctions to the regulation of police behavior. One proposal suggests that an independent review board, rather than the courts, determine penalties for police behavior. 19 3 Whether a court or an independent review board is used, the direct punishment of officers, coupled with the admissibility of reliable, tainted evidence, would offer greater protection for fourth amendment rights and the truthseeking process than is presently provided by the exclusionary rule. THOMAS J. KINASZ 193 S. SCHLESINGER, .supra note 2, at 72-76. As in the contempt alternative, illegally obtained evidence could still be used in the criminal trial.
Professor Schlesinger prefers a board over a judge because (1) the board has more time and resources to investigate alleged misconduct than a judge, and (2) a board would have the capacity to investigate the possibility that an officer's supervisors encouraged or ordered the misconduct. As the contempt alternative has been designed in this Comment, however, the appointment of special prosecutors for police contempt would permit an arm of the court to adequately pursue police misconduct and a monitor to oversee police action would be able to oversee police actions that never came out during a criminal trial. Moreover, since the judiciary has the responsibility for protecting the Constitution, the sanctioning of misbehaving officers should remain in the care of a cd-equal branch of government rather than an independent review board. The practical difficulties in obtaining judicial involvement might necessitate the use of a non-judicial review board.
